Uber gap: 150,000 people, driver’s licenses, stolen, attack via third party
14 November 2026, Uber confirmed that it was hacked.
150,000 people affected.
But what is interesting is not the number.
Is what was stolen: driver’s license Numbers.
And how it happened: via third party involved.
What happened
The gap
FACT (according to Just Security):
Uber was hacked. 150,000 people affected.
The stolen data:
- Full name
- Address
- Driver’s license numbers
- Access via third-party provider committed
Scale
150,000 people means:
- 150,000 identities potentially at risk
- 150,000 data driving exposed
- 150,000 address compromised
Vector: committed Third party
FACT: The attack was not to Uber directly.
Went to a third-party service provider that had access to Uber.
Such third parties was compromised.
The attacker used the credentials to the third party’s access to Uber.
Why it was possible to
Vulnerability 1: Third party without security
If the third party was compromised means:
- Security of the third party was weak
- Or credentials of the third party were stolen
- Or access to the third party was not validated
Vulnerability 2: Uber relied too much
If the committed third party had access to:
- Full name
- Address
- Driver’s license
Means:
- Non-segregated access
- The third had permissions that are too broad
- There was not a validation of that third party only see what is necessary
Vulnerability 3: Lack of detection
If 150,000 records were stolen without being detected means:
- There is No monitoring of exfiltration data in bulk
- There is No warning when ‘too much data’ are being accessed
- There is No correlation between access ‘anomalous’ and ‘exfiltration’
The impact
For drivers of Uber
- License numbers in the hands of criminals
- Risk of identity fraud
- Risk of targeting specific (criminals know address + license)
- Privacy compromised
For Uber
- Confidence gap with drivers
- Possible legal action
- Regulators will investigate
- Reputational harm
For any company with any third party
This is the pattern:
- Third party is committed
- Attacker uses credentials of a third party
- Access to sensitive data
- Exfiltra bulk data
And it is becoming more common.
How it happened (analysis)
Phase 1: Engage the third party
The third was committed via:
- Credentials weaknesses of the third party
- Phishing employee of a third party
- Vulnerability is not patched in systems of third party
- Or access inherited from gap previous
Phase 2: Access to Uber
Using credentials of a third party:
- Attacker agreed to systems of Uber
- Access validation happened because it seemed to be the third
- Access was enabled automatically
Phase 3: Exfiltration
Once inside:
- He agreed to a database of drivers
- Extracted 150,000 records
- Probably without the alert because it seemed normal traffic of a third party
How to 24Cevent would have helped
If Uber had 24Cevent validating access of third parties:
Detection of the third party committed
When the party began to be anomalous:
- Monitoring: ‘Pattern of different access of the third party’
- Correlation: the ‘Third party normally accesses X, now accesses 1000x’
- Action: auto-Lock + research
Access anomalous detected immediately.
Detection of exfiltration massive
When 150,000 records were dumps:
- Monitoring: ‘massive Volume of data to be downloaded’
- Correlation: ‘Volume is 1000x greater than normal pattern’
- Action: Lock download + isolation of a third party
Exfiltration is stopped in seconds, not complete.
Continuous validation of third parties
24Cevent would validate continuously:
- What the third party is accessing only what you need?
- Are there changes in the access pattern of the third party?
- Are there indicators of compromise of the third party?
Result: committed Third party is detected immediately.
The lesson
This pattern repeats:
- The Post: committed Third party
- Muji: Vulnerability in storage
- Uber: committed Third party
- The European Telecom: committed Third party
The majority of gaps mass are via third parties.
Because:
- It is easier to engage third party company main
- Third parties often have weak security
- Once credentials to third party access is automatic
For any company to:
- Third parties are NOT trusted automatic
- Third-party access SHOULD be monitored
- Exfiltration MUST be blocked automatically
SOURCES CHECKED: